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The Effective Competition Standard:  
A New Standard for Antitrust 
Marshall Steinbaum† & Maurice E. Stucke†† 
America’s failing antitrust system is, in large part, to blame for today’s market 
power problem. Lax antitrust law and enforcement have allowed troubling trends 
like corporate consolidation to remain unchallenged, further embedding our skewed 
economy. In highly concentrated markets, individuals have limited choice and little 
power to pick their price, quality, or provider for the goods and services they need; 
workers are met with powerful employers and have little agency to shop around or 
bargain for competitive wages and benefits; and suppliers can’t reach the market 
without paying powerful intermediaries or succumbing to acquisition. 
Our Essay offers an alternative to the courts’ consumer welfare standard. Am-
biguous and inadequate, the consumer welfare standard identifies threats to com-
petition only by the potential consequences for consumers and ignores adverse effects 
on workers, suppliers, product quality, and innovation. 
Our effective competition standard would restore the primary aim of antitrust 
laws—namely, to promote competition wherever in the economy it has been compro-
mised, including throughout supply chains and in the labor market. These changes 
are essential to protect competitive markets in the United States, as well as individ-
uals and the economy at large, by deconcentrating private power. 
INTRODUCTION 
America, as legal and economic scholars are increasingly not-
ing, has a market power problem. The emerging evidence points 
to less competition, higher markups, greater concentration, and 
widening wealth and income inequality. The current state of com-
petition law benefits the select few—at the expense of nearly eve-
ryone else. 
Our antitrust laws are supposed to deal with concentrated 
economic power. The problem is that the laws have been hijacked 
in two ways. First, ideologues narrowed the substance of antitrust 
from addressing a variety of goals to focusing solely on the concept 
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of consumer welfare—namely, that harm to competition within 
the legal meaning of the antitrust laws consists solely of harm to 
consumers and their welfare, as measured almost exclusively by 
price and quantity effects in output markets. Second, some courts 
and enforcers went even further, declining to find antitrust liabil-
ity in conduct that harms consumers on the theory that it carries 
other benefits, like long-run economic growth. Recent US Su-
preme Court decisions, including Ohio v American Express Co,1 
and the US District Court’s decision to allow the AT&T/Time 
Warner merger2 illustrate how antitrust, under the prevailing 
consumer welfare standard, has been weakened and distorted be-
yond all recognition. Courts have elevated the burden of proof on 
the government and other antitrust plaintiffs to such an extent 
that the Sherman3 and Clayton4 Antitrust Acts have become unen-
forceable for many anticompetitive practices, other than cartels. 
If the United States continues with a light-if-any-touch anti-
trust review of mergers and turns a blind eye to abuses by domi-
nant firms, concentration and crony capitalism will likely in-
crease, competition and our well-being will decrease further, and 
power and profits will continue to fall into fewer hands. Startups, 
small and midsize firms, and Americans more broadly—as work-
ers, consumers, and democratic citizens—will be left to the benef-
icence or spite of a few powerful, but arbitrary, corporations. 
This trend is reversible if we restore antitrust as a guarantor 
of effective competition. To tackle today’s market power problem, 
we offer an effective competition antitrust standard to replace the 
prevailing consumer welfare standard, which courts and scholars 
have interpreted differently (and at times inconsistently). The ef-
fective competition standard restores the primary aim of the an-
titrust laws—namely, the dispersion and deconcentration of sig-
nificant private power wherever in the economy it is to be found, 
including throughout supply chains and in the labor market. 
Antitrust does not operate at the margins. In reality, anti-
trust has been enormously important for structuring the economy 
now and in the past, either in favor of concentrating economic 
power or against it. Although this Essay articulates antitrust pol-
icies aimed at deconcentrating power, we recognize that antitrust 
 
 1 138 S Ct 2274 (2018). 
 2 United States v AT&T Inc, 310 F Supp 3d 161, 253–54 (DDC 2018), affd 916 F3d 
1029 (DC Cir 2019). 
 3 26 Stat 209 (1890), codified as amended at 15 USC §§ 1–7. 
 4 38 Stat 730 (1914), codified as amended in various sections of Title 15 and Title 29. 
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alone cannot accomplish this urgent objective. Progressive taxa-
tion, labor reforms, effective (not captured) sector-specific regula-
tion, corporate governance, and social welfare policies are only 
some of the other policy tools necessary. Thus, while strong anti-
trust enforcement is often an important condition for preserving 
a competitive market structure, policymakers should not confine 
themselves to that tool. 
To understand the need for an effective competition stand-
ard, it is helpful to initially take a historical perspective. Part I 
describes the rise of the consumer welfare standard since the late 
1970s and the operational difficulties that the courts and agencies 
have experienced in applying this standard. As recent empirical 
research reveals, the consumer welfare standard, paradoxically, 
has neither helped consumers nor their welfare. Instead, the US 
economy has a market power problem, with a small number of firms 
reaping significant supracompetitive profits in many industries. 
To promote competition and a more inclusive economy, 
Part II outlines an effective competition standard. Part III out-
lines changes to antitrust interpretation, law, and enforcement 
that would occur under the effective competition standard. 
Part IV addresses alternative legal and political means by which 
these changes could be accomplished. 
I.  THE RISE OF THE CONSUMER WELFARE STANDARD SINCE THE 
LATE 1970S AND ENSUING OPERATIONAL DIFFICULTIES IN 
APPLYING IT 
In 1987, one scholar remarked that the terms “efficiency” and 
“consumer welfare” have “become the dominant terms of antitrust 
discourse without any clear consensus as to what they exactly 
mean” and that consumer welfare is “the most abused term in 
modern antitrust analysis.”5 This remains true today. 
Before 1975, the Supreme Court never mentioned the term 
“consumer welfare” in an antitrust case.6 That changed with the 
rise of the Chicago School of Economics in the late 1970s, symbol-
ized by the publication of then-Professor Robert Bork’s book The 
 
 5 Joseph F. Brodley, The Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Consumer Welfare, 
and Technological Progress, 62 NYU L Rev 1020, 1020, 1032 (1987). See also Walter 
Adams and James W. Brock, The Antitrust Vision and Its Revisionist Critics, 35 NY L Sch 
L Rev 939, 943–46 (1990). 
 6 See United States v Citizens & Southern National Bank, 422 US 86, 131 n 1 (1975) 
(Brennan dissenting). 
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Antitrust Paradox in 1978.7 Over the past forty years, Chicago 
School–influenced enforcers viewed the political and moral cases 
for antitrust as insufficiently rigorous and somehow diluting an-
titrust policy from its true purpose: promoting economic effi-
ciency, which the Chicago School frequently conflated with con-
sumer welfare.8 Under their view, antitrust relied on an 
incomplete and distorted conception of competition.9 
The Chicago School assumed that markets are self-correcting 
and that free entry is a “natural” condition that erodes incumbent 
market power.10 These substantive economic assumptions have 
never achieved hegemony inside or outside of antitrust econom-
ics, but they nonetheless seriously affected both non–Chicago-
affiliated scholars and the judiciary. That’s because the Harvard 
School had its own, somewhat derivative, reasons for doubting 
the efficacy of robust antitrust enforcement—namely, that it was 
not properly aimed at moral or political goals and that antitrust 
intervention might serve to inflict more harm than good on the 
efficient operation of the economy.11 
Thus, there was no need for robust antitrust enforcement to 
create or maintain the conditions necessary to make competition 
effective. Contemporary antitrust consensus derives from the 
view that market forces could naturally correct the episodic in-
stances of market power and could do so far better and more 
quickly than government intervention. Furthermore, interven-
tionist antitrust enforcement was more likely to create durable 
 
 7 See generally Robert Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself 
(Basic Books 1978). 
 8 See Mark Glick, The Unsound Theory Behind the Consumer (and Total) Welfare 
Goal in Antitrust, 63 Antitrust Bull 455, 485–92 (2018); Maurice E. Stucke, Reconsidering 
Antitrust’s Goals, 53 BC L Rev 551, 563–66 (2012). 
 9 For a description of the Chicago School’s conception of competition, see Richard A. 
Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U Pa L Rev 925, 931–33 (1979). For 
some criticisms, see Amanda P. Reeves and Maurice E. Stucke, Behavioral Antitrust, 86 
Ind L J 1527, 1548, 1554–70 (2011); Maurice E. Stucke, Better Competition Advocacy, 82 
St John’s L Rev 951, 957, 979–87 (2008). 
 10 See Stucke, 82 St John’s L Rev at 957 (cited in note 9). 
 11 See William E. Kovacic, The Intellectual DNA of Modern U.S. Competition Law for 
Dominant Firm Conduct: The Chicago/Harvard Double Helix, 2007 Colum Bus L Rev 1, 
17–33; William E. Kovacic, The Chicago Obsession in the Interpretation of U.S. Antitrust 
History, 87 U Chi L Rev 459, 464–66, 478–82 (2020). 
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market power than to erode it.12 The authorities accepted the in-
creased risks from concentrated telecommunications13 and finan-
cial14 industries, among others, for the prospect of future efficien-
cies and innovation, with the possible harm they might cause to 
competition assumed to be “disciplined” by the omnipresent 
threat of free entry enabled by inevitably procompetitive “techno-
logical change.” 
Under the consumer welfare standard, antitrust enforce-
ment, outside of cartel prosecutions, declined. By the start of the 
Trump administration, the US had neither a popular antitrust 
movement nor many significant antitrust prosecutions.15 For ex-
ample, over the past twenty years, the Department of Justice 
(DOJ) has brought only one major monopolization case under Sec-
tion 2 of the Sherman Act, against Microsoft.16 And even though 
the government prevailed on some of its charges, the appellate 
court took the opportunity to weaken some aspects of the law and 
raise procedural burdens on plaintiffs.17 The Microsoft appellate 
ruling and even the DOJ’s decisions reflected a profound ambiva-
lence about whether antitrust could be effective at structuring 
markets to benefit the public.18 In contrast to the past twenty-year 
drought, the DOJ, between 1970 and 1972, brought thirty-nine 
civil and three criminal cases against monopolies and oligopolies.19 
As we elaborate elsewhere,20 the consumer welfare standard 
has numerous infirmities, including the following: 
 
 12 See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 Tex L Rev 1, 17–40 (1984). 
See also Bork, Antitrust Paradox at 406–07 (cited in note 7). 
 13 See Tim Wu, The Master Switch: The Rise and Fall of Information Empires 244–
45 (Knopf 2010). 
 14 See Simon Johnson and James Kwak, Thirteen Bankers: The Wall Street Takeover 
and the Next Financial Meltdown 12, 203 (Pantheon 2010); Jesse W. Markham Jr, Lessons 
for Competition Law from the Economic Crisis: The Prospect for Antitrust Responses to the 
“Too-Big-to-Fail” Phenomenon, 16 Fordham J Corp & Fin L 261, 291 (2011). 
 15 Kovacic, 87 U Chi L Rev at 479–80 (cited in note 11). 
 16 See United States v Microsoft Corp, 87 F Supp 2d 30, 35 (DDC 2000), affd in part, 
revd in part, 253 F3d 34, 118–19 (DC Cir 2001). See also generally Department of Justice, 
Antitrust Division Workload Statistics FY 2009–2018 (July 1, 2019), archived at 
https://perma.cc/F7DC-JDUE; Department of Justice, Antitrust Division Workload Statis-
tics FY 2000–2009 (Apr 4, 2012), archived at https://perma.cc/2MTB-J8LU. 
 17 See Microsoft, 253 F3d at 80–81, 107. 
 18 See Andrew I. Gavil and Harry First, The Microsoft Antitrust Cases: Competition 
Policy for the Twenty-First Century 116–31 (MIT 2014). 
 19 Department of Justice, Antitrust Division Workload Statistics FY 1970–1979, ar-
chived at https://perma.cc/35CW-G5N9. 
 20 See Marshall I. Steinbaum and Maurice E. Stucke, The Effective Competition 
Standard: A New Standard for Antitrust *11–21 (Roosevelt Institute, Sept 2018), archived 
at https://perma.cc/AR68-6XKN. 
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• Under the consumer welfare standard, competition is di-
minishing, which harms consumers, workers, and innova-
tion: The infirmities of the consumer welfare standard 
would be less alarming if the welfare of consumers actu-
ally increased over the past forty years. If that were the 
case, one could quibble that their welfare might have in-
creased a little more under a better antitrust standard, 
but it would be a question of degree. The sad reality, how-
ever, is that competition, under the consumer welfare 
standard, has diminished significantly in many markets. 
The consumer welfare standard, it turns out, benefited 
neither consumers nor their welfare. 
• Difficulty in Reconciling the Consumer Welfare Standard 
with Upstream Abuses: The standard is hard to reconcile 
with plainly anticompetitive restraints that do not affect 
consumers and instead affect only upstream sellers and 
workers, such as no-poaching agreements. 
• No Well-Accepted Definition: The consumer welfare 
standard has not fostered global convergence. It means 
different things to different competition agencies around 
the world. 
• Rule of Law Concerns: Given the varying definitions of 
consumer welfare that exist, it is not surprising that 
courts have reached inconsistent results based on their 
own conceptions of consumer welfare. Rather than an ob-
jective standard, the consumer welfare standard invites 
considerable subjectivity—and, more to the point, toler-
ance of anticompetitive practices. 
Consequently, the consumer welfare standard provides little 
guidance as an antitrust goal. There remains no consensus on what 
the term actually means or who the consumers are. Under any of 
the current definitions, there remains “no easy, non-contestable 
method for quantifying harm to consumer welfare that will work 
for all cases.”21 Moreover, under this standard, antitrust has con-
tributed to, rather than prevented, America’s current market 
power problem. 
 
 21 Competition Enforcement and Consumer Welfare: Setting the Agenda 47 (Interna-
tional Competition Network, 2011), archived at https://perma.cc/GH9U-CJQK. 
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Antitrust is supposed to play a critical role in promoting open 
and competitive markets. Today’s market power problem matters 
because society overall pays a stiff price. We end up with a less 
stable, less efficient economy that generates less growth, less pub-
lic investment, and less opportunity.22 Our democracy is weak-
ened with greater voter disillusionment and greater distrust in 
our government as 99 percent of the population are disempow-
ered. The greatest cost imposed on society is “the erosion of our 
sense of identity in which fair play, equality of opportunity, and 
a sense of community are so important.”23 
Economic policies entail choices, and all economic policies 
have distributive consequences. Much of America’s economic ine-
quality resulted from deliberate legal and enforcement decisions, 
whereby the government, over the past forty years, failed to pro-
tect the 99 percent. Instead, the economically powerful used the 
government to enrich themselves at society’s expense. Because 
antitrust policy is a necessary (but not sufficient) tool to redress 
the market power problem, it is time for a new antitrust standard. 
II.  THE EFFECTIVE COMPETITION STANDARD 
Antitrust, historically, was never about promoting either al-
locative efficiency or consumer welfare. Instead, antitrust aimed 
to deconcentrate private power by protecting the competitive  
process.24 
No doubt the goal of promoting an effective competitive pro-
cess has its own infirmities. It simply shifts the debate to a larger, 
unresolved issue—defining an effective competitive process. With-
out one, antitrust becomes a tautology: the goal of competition 
law is “promoting competition by discouraging anti-competitive 
behaviour.”25 
Thus, to provide courts and agencies greater guidance, we 
first propose the following effective competition standard: 
 
 22 See generally Jonathan B. Baker, The Antitrust Paradigm: Restoring a Competi-
tive Economy (Harvard 2019). 
 23 Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Price of Inequality: How Today’s Divided Society Endangers 
Our Future 117 (Norton 2012). 
 24 See, for example, Barak Orbach, How Antitrust Lost Its Goal, 81 Fordham L Rev 
2253, 2256 (2013). 
 25 Consumer Unity & Trust Society Centre for Competition, Investment and Eco-
nomic Regulation, Towards a Healthy Competition Culture... *i (2003), archived at 
https://perma.cc/W89G-5RWK. 
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Agencies and courts shall use the preservation of competitive 
market structures that protect individuals, purchasers, con-
sumers, and producers; preserve opportunities for competi-
tors; promote individual autonomy and well-being; and dis-
perse private power as the principal objective of the federal 
antitrust laws. 
Let us unpack each element: 
• “Preservation of competitive market structures”: This rec-
ognizes that competition is not a natural state, nor can it 
be ensured by focusing on consumer surplus. Horizontal 
and vertical consolidation should be viewed with suspi-
cion given the failure of the current antitrust regime that 
has been credulous about their ostensible benefits. 
• “Protect individuals, purchasers, consumers, and producers”: 
Antitrust law protects both the resiliency of the supply 
chain itself and market participants throughout the sup-
ply chain—including individuals, consumers, workers, 
and upstream suppliers. 
• “Preserve opportunities for competitors”: It is a fundamen-
tal value to have competition at every level of the supply 
chain and for upstream firms to have access to the market 
without coercion, interference, exclusion, or discrimina-
tion by powerful and potentially vertically integrated 
middlemen. 
• “Promote individual autonomy and well-being”: Courts 
have historically interpreted the antitrust laws as “the 
Magna Carta of free enterprise” and as “important to the 
preservation of economic freedom and our free-enterprise 
system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fun-
damental personal freedoms.”26 Competition policy can 
foster an inclusive economy that promotes important val-
ues, including autonomy and overall well-being.27 This is 
especially important with respect to buyer power—and 
particularly when that power is exercised in labor mar-
kets. “Men are not free,” wrote Justice Louis Brandeis, “if 
 
 26 United States v Topco Associates, Inc, 405 US 596, 610 (1972). 
 27 See generally Maurice E. Stucke, Should Competition Policy Promote Happiness?, 
81 Fordham L Rev 2575 (2013). 
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dependent industrially on the arbitrary will of another.”28 
The Clayton Act’s language that labor is not a commodity 
reflects this wisdom.29 Most individuals rely on their labor 
to earn their living. In economic terms, that supply by in-
dividual workers is highly inelastic. As a result, workers 
can often be exposed to coercion by powerful employers. 
Preventing this coercion is an end in itself. 
• “Disperse private power”: Economic power often trans-
lates into political power—not simply in the formal polit-
ical system, but in everyday relations between employers 
and workers, between concentrated buyers and diffuse 
suppliers, and in channeling and directing the flow of in-
formation across social media platforms. A fundamental 
aim of antitrust is to prevent anticompetitive, antidemo-
cratic pressures that arise from concentrated economic 
power and to ensure an inclusive, equitable distribution 
of power throughout the economy, including throughout 
supply chains and within firms.30 As free markets operate 
within (rather than outside) our legal, ethical, moral, po-
litical, and social framework, the competitive process, if 
properly designed and maintained, should both limit the 
ability of shareholders and managers to exploit other 
stakeholders and prevent historically disadvantaged 
groups from being excluded or marginalized from the 
economy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 28 Tim Wu, The Curse of Bigness: Antitrust in the New Gilded Age 40 (Columbia 
Global Reports 2018). 
 29 See Clayton Act § 6, 38 Stat at 731, codified at 15 USC § 17 (“[T]he labor of a hu-
man being is not a commodity or article of commerce.”). 
 30 See, for example, Wu, Curse of Bigness at 54–58 (cited in note 28) (discussing how 
the more concentrated the industry, the more corrupted we can expect the political pro-
cess); Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U Pa L Rev 1051, 1051–52 
(1979) (“It is bad history, bad policy, and bad law to exclude certain political values in inter-
preting the antitrust laws,” and any antitrust policy that excluded such political values 
“would be unresponsive to the will of Congress.”); Louis B. Schwartz, ‘‘Justice” and Other 
Non-Economic Goals of Antitrust, 127 U Pa L Rev 1076, 1076 (1979) (“[P]utative economic 
gains should not be the exclusive or decisive factor in resolving antitrust controversies.”). 
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III.  HOW THE EFFECTIVE COMPETITION STANDARD WOULD 
MODIFY THE STATUS QUO 
The effective competition standard differs from both the con-
sumer welfare standard and the total welfare standard31 in that 
it expressly departs from the partial-equilibrium analysis of a sin-
gle market as the basis for antitrust analysis. The effective com-
petition standard further differs from the consumer welfare 
standard in four important ways: 
• First, a substantial lessening of competition suffices for 
liability. Enforcers and courts need not demonstrate how 
the lessening of competition harms consumers, nor bal-
ance the harms to one set of stakeholders against the sup-
posed benefits for another.32 In this respect, the effective 
competition standard makes antitrust more enforceable. 
• Second, it recognizes that competition needs competitors. 
Thus, it takes a tougher stance on monopolistic, preda-
tory, and exclusionary practices, which often reduce the 
competitive opportunities for entrants and rivals. 
 
 31 The total welfare standard, now largely abandoned, cares only about economic ef-
ficiency and takes no stance as to how surplus is split between consumers and sellers. In 
more concrete terms, it locates antitrust harm to competition only in negative output ef-
fects and does not consider increases in price as evidence that competition has been 
harmed. 
 32 Proving consumer harm is often difficult on the selling side—especially for inter-
mediary goods. Proving buyer power’s adverse impact on the ultimate consumer is even 
more problematic and difficult. A consumer welfare screen, when actually applied, gives 
an incomplete and distorted measure of consumer harm. Antitrust enforcers typically con-
sider the challenged behavior’s immediate effect on prices. If retail prices remain un-
changed (or decline), then the competition authority, under a consumer-harm screen, 
would likely conclude that the challenged practice is competitively neutral or procompeti-
tive. They would not investigate further the complaints over buyer power and would likely 
dismiss any non-price concerns as too tenuous or speculative. This exposes one fundamen-
tal difficulty in measuring consumer welfare. Buyer power can harm consumers, albeit 
indirectly. Upstream sellers are also consumers, such as farmers with less money to pur-
chase goods. Our welfare is further reduced when negative externalities increase, such as 
when farmers with tighter margins cut corners by polluting more, engaging in less sus-
tainable farming, allowing a more dangerous workplace, or hiring underage workers. Com-
petition authorities generally do not consider these other harder-to-quantify harms, which 
may exceed the short-term benefits from lower prices. The authorities lack the tools to 
assess the short- and long-term harms arising from buyer power (for example, less variety 
and innovation). Thus, if a monopsony depresses wages in a local community, which in 
turn increases the taxpayers’ costs, would that be factored into the agency’s consumer 
welfare screen? Unlikely. 
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• Third, unlike the consumer welfare standard, which con-
siders the impact only on consumers, the effective compe-
tition standard protects market participants throughout 
the supply chain, including workers and sellers. 
• Finally, by eliminating the precarious step of how the 
lessening of competition will harm consumers’ welfare, 
the effective competition standard restores the purpose of 
the Clayton Act to “arrest restraints of trade in their in-
cipiency and before they develop into full-fledged re-
straints violative of the Sherman Act.” As Congress 
noted, “A requirement of certainty and actuality of injury 
to competition is incompatible with any effort to supple-
ment the Sherman Act by reaching incipient restraints.”33 
To promote competition and innovation in our heavily con-
centrated markets, the effective competition standard would de-
part from today’s light-touch antitrust policies in the following 
areas. 
A. Establish a New, Clearer Set of Indicia for Determining 
Whether a Firm Has Market Power 
The standard would first reverse the Court’s illogical require-
ment of circumstantial evidence in American Express.34 The gov-
ernment plaintiffs argued that they need not define the relevant 
market because they had actual evidence of adverse effects on 
competition—namely, increased merchant fees. The Court disa-
greed. It distinguished the cases the plaintiffs cited as involving 
horizontal restraints. As the Court opined, “Vertical restraints of-
ten pose no risk to competition unless the entity imposing them 
has market power, which cannot be evaluated unless the [c]ourt 
first defines the relevant market.”35 
But it is axiomatic that market power can be proven with di-
rect or circumstantial evidence. So it makes little sense to require 
plaintiffs with direct evidence of market power to also prove mar-
ket power with circumstantial evidence. Imagine a prosecutor 
with direct evidence of a serial killer’s crimes being required to 
offer circumstantial evidence. 
 
 33 Brown Shoe Co v United States, 370 US 294, 323 n 39 (1962), quoting S Rep 
No 1775, 81st Cong, 2d Sess 6 (1950), reprinted in 1950 USCCAN 4293, 4298. 
 34 See American Express, 138 S Ct at 2284, 2290. 
 35 Id at 2285 n 7. 
606 The University of Chicago Law Review [86:595 
 
As a result of the Court’s latest perplexing requirement in 
cases involving vertical restraints, plaintiffs will have to define a 
relevant market (often a costly, time-consuming endeavor, using 
antitrust’s price-centric tools), calculate the defendant’s market 
share in that market, and then show that the market share is high 
enough to infer the defendant’s market power, even when plaintiffs 
have strong evidence of the restraint’s anticompetitive effects. 
Rather than establishing one criterion for market power—a 
high market share in an antitrust market—the courts should al-
low direct and circumstantial evidence of market power. As many 
scholars have argued, high market shares are dispositive neither 
in favor of nor against market power, and therefore a broader 
range of indicia are necessary. Indeed, as the economic evidence 
reflects, firms with low market shares nonetheless can, at times, 
exercise significant market power upstream against suppliers 
and workers.36 These indicia of market power include: 
• The unilateral ability to set prices or wages, or to charge 
prices in excess of the competitive level or pay wages be-
low workers’ marginal productivity; 
• The ability to impose disadvantageous nonprice contrac-
tual terms on counterparties or to revise contractual 
terms in one’s own favor, including by depressing quality, 
privacy, innovation, or variety below competitive levels; 
• The ability to exclude competitors or entrants; 
• The unilateral ability to restrict output or employment; 
• The ability to price or wage discriminate;37 and 
 
 36 See, for example, Peter C. Carstensen, Competition Policy and the Control of Buyer 
Power: A Global Issue 65–78 (Edward Elgar 2017); Maurice E. Stucke, Looking at the Mo-
nopsony in the Mirror, 62 Emory L J 1509, 1533–40 (2013). 
 37 The Court in Illinois Tool Works Inc v Independent Ink, Inc, 547 US 28 (2006) 
noted how price discrimination “may provide evidence of market power,” but that “it is 
generally recognized that it also occurs in fully competitive markets.” Id at 44–45.  
Although the Court cites, inter alia, William J. Baumol and Daniel G. Swanson, The New 
Economy and Ubiquitous Competitive Price Discrimination: Identifying Defensible Crite-
ria of Market Power, 70 Antitrust L J 661, 666 (2003), those authors, in fact, assume mar-
ket power by way of market segmentation—consumers are prevented from transacting 
with one another. Id at 681 n 38. The Court also cites William M. Landes and Richard A. 
Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law 374–75 (Belknap 2003), but 
Posner elsewhere noted that “[p]ersistent price discrimination can be evidence of monop-
oly because it is inconsistent with a competitive market.” Richard A. Posner, Antitrust 
Law 80 (Chicago 2d ed 2001). Our point here is simply that it is evidence of market power, 
and the discrimination itself may be exploitative or benign. 
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• The ability to earn profits or make payouts to sharehold-
ers in excess of a firm’s cost of capital for an extended pe-
riod of time. 
Under the effective-competition standard, any of these could 
be used by plaintiffs to establish market power. 
B. Update Monopolization/Monopsonization Policy and 
Reinvigorate Enforcement of Section 2 of the Sherman Act 
Under the Supreme Court’s current consumer welfare stand-
ard, monopolies have little to fear, as the Court has significantly 
limited their potential liability for their anticompetitive actions. 
Predatory pricing cases have all but disappeared.38 Courts now 
opine that monopolies have no duty to deal. And for all of these 
anticompetitive actions, courts must entertain “efficiency” de-
fenses—as though otherwise illegal conduct, like fraud, might 
somehow be rectified by some larger benefit to society, a standard 
that exists in no other area of law.39 
The effective competition standard would rectify several 
shortcomings of the Court’s economic policymaking under Sec-
tion 2 of the Sherman Act—which is imperative if the economy’s 
existing and growing market power problem is to be reversed, as 
opposed to merely slowed. The essential thrust of monopoliza-
tion/monopsonization policy under the effective competition 
standard would be to impose a more restrictive competition policy 
than prevails by default on firms with significant market power. 
Under the effective competition standard, a defendant’s uni-
lateral anticompetitive conduct would violate the Sherman Act if: 
• First, the defendant has, and exercises, significant mar-
ket power, in accordance with one of more of the indicia 
outlined above; 
• Second, this power excludes some potential competition 
and/or limits or has limited some actual competition; and 
 
 38 The DOJ, for example, brought its last predation case in 1999, which it lost. See 
United States v AMR Corp, 335 F3d 1109, 1121 (10th Cir 2003). 
 39 See Microsoft, 253 F3d at 59, 77; Department of Justice and Federal Trade Com-
mission, Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 10 (Aug 19, 2010), archived at https://perma.cc/ 
B3RM-WGMN. 
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• Third, this power is not attributable solely to the defend-
ant’s ability, economies of scale, research, or natural  
advantages. 
Next, as part of streamlining enforcement against unilateral 
conduct, the effective competition standard entails establishing cer-
tain actions as presumptive violations of Section 2 of the Sherman 
Act, including: 
• Otherwise unlawful conduct that helps a firm attain or 
maintain monopoly or monopsony power; 
• Predatory pricing below marginal cost for an extended pe-
riod of time, for the purpose of excluding competitors and 
preserving market power, without the need for plaintiffs 
to prove “recoupment”;40 
• Simpler standards for assessing when refusals to deal41 
and exclusive dealing42 are illegal, including when they 
violate suppliers’ right of market access; and 
 
 40 This standard would foster greater convergence internationally. See, for example, 
AKZO Chemie BV v Commission of the European Communities, ECR I-3359, 3454–56 (EU 
Just 1991) (holding that it is presumptively illegal if a dominant firm prices below average 
variable cost to eliminate a competitor, and that if the dominant firm prices between total 
cost and average variable cost, this could be abusive with evidence of anticompetitive intent). 
 41 The criteria for determining when refusals to deal are anticompetitive might include: 
• The dominant firm controls a product, service, resource, or facility that is neces-
sary for carrying on a particular business; 
• The refusal is likely to significantly exclude competition; 
• The refusal prevents the emergence of a new product for which there is potential 
consumer demand, or the refusal prevents improving current products in a rel-
evant market; and 
• The dominant firm cannot objectively justify, with particular facts, its refusal. 
Our proposal would promote greater internal convergence with EU law on the question of 
when a dominant firm has a duty to deal. See generally Communication from the Commis-
sion—Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 of the 
EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings (Official Journal 
of the European Union, Feb 2009), archived at https://perma.cc/E27M-CGM8. This has 
become an especially important issue in the digital economy. See, for example, Mark R. 
Warner, Potential Policy Proposals for Regulation of Social Media and Technology Firms 
*21–23 (draft white paper), archived at https://perma.cc/S4EA-A67K (discussing the need 
for interoperability and fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory (FRAND) terms for essen-
tial facilities). 
 42 Any significant restraint by a dominant firm on other companies’ freedom to com-
pete should generally require a legitimate justification. Such an approach would allow for 
contracts and other restraints that promote competition. The new standard, consistent 
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• “Cheap exclusion,” or actions on the part of a dominant 
firm that cost little, that are intended to exclude, disad-
vantage, or discriminate against competitors within its 
market, and that do not improve efficiency.43 
To make clear that a range of harms are to be considered 
when a firm engages in price discrimination, we additionally rec-
ommend amending Section 2 of the Clayton Act to prohibit price 
discrimination when it hurts consumers, workers, or other mar-
ket participants, as when a firm tracks individuals’ spending pat-
terns, collects personal data, and targets them in ways that get 
them to buy things they otherwise did not want at the highest 
price they are willing to pay (or lowest wage they are willing to 
work).44 Alternatively, Congress could consider limiting customer 
data collection in the first place. 
C. Merger Policy Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act 
Antitrust laws generally are intended to prevent harmful ac-
cumulations of market power from forming in the first place. Un-
der current merger policy, however, the burden is on enforcers to 
make the case that merging firms will likely lessen competition 
(namely through higher prices), resulting in lax merger review 
and unchallenged large-scale acquisitions. To correct the merger-
review process, we recommend the following amendments to Sec-
tion 7 of the Clayton Act45: 
• Rather than placing the burden on the plaintiffs, the bur-
den would shift to parties seeking to merge in ways that 
would either (a) significantly increase concentration lev-
els or (b) be undertaken by firms that already hold signif-
icant market power—as demonstrated through the indi-
cia outlined above. The merging parties would have to 
prove that their proposed acquisition would not materi-
ally lessen competition, create a monopoly or monopsony, 
 
with the developments on competition law outside of the US, would deter dominant gate-
keepers or technology platforms from engaging in exclusionary behavior that has signifi-
cant potential to foreclose competitors and diminish competition. 
 43 See, for example, Susan A. Creighton, et al, Cheap Exclusion, 72 Antitrust L J 975, 
980–82 (2005). 
 44 See, for example, John B. Kirkwood, Reforming the Robinson-Patman Act to Serve 
Consumers and Control Powerful Buyers, 60 Antitrust Bull 358, 359–61, 374–75 (2015). 
See 15 USC § 13. 
 45 See 15 USC § 18. 
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or help maintain their market power.46 This would deter 
monopolies/monopsonies from acquiring nascent compet-
itive threats, thereby preserving their market power 
while potentially hindering innovation. 
• Courts should be required to take all potential competi-
tive outcomes of a merger into account: not just prices for 
consumers, but also nonprice effects such as harm to 
quality, choice, innovation, and privacy. The agencies and 
courts should examine upstream effects on workers and 
suppliers and downstream effects on customers and oth-
ers who could be harmed, and cannot assume that market 
power exercised upstream would result in “efficiencies” 
downstream or could be offset by them.47 
• Congress should prohibit vertical mergers when they could 
foster the firm’s ability and incentive to distort competition. 
 
 46 Our proposal does not define the baseline of when acquisitions significantly in-
crease concentration levels. One reason is that the threshold/criteria will likely differ when 
evaluating upstream versus downstream effects because monopsonies are not the mirror 
image of monopolies. Another reason is that the appropriate threshold will likely be lower 
than the 2010 Merger Guidelines’ Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) thresholds. Profes-
sor John Kwoka’s data, based on examining postmerger reviews, suggest that lowering 
the HHI threshold from the current levels in the 2010 Merger Guidelines and creating a 
separate threshold based on the number of significant remaining competitors. Thus, one 
could justify restoring the HHI threshold to earlier levels (or no higher than 2000 levels) 
and the number of significant remaining competitors at no lower than five. But as Kwoka 
recognized, his data set involves only industries for which there was a postmerger review. 
Given that economic studies have recently explored the degree to which companies exer-
cise market power, another HHI threshold or threshold of remaining competitors may be 
warranted. John Kwoka, Reviving Merger Control: A Comprehensive Plan for Reforming 
Policy and Practice *33–37 (Antitrust Institute Working Paper, Oct 2018), archived at 
https://perma.cc/JC62-WTAA. 
 47 Arguably, the agencies should already do this under the Clayton Act and their own 
merger guidelines. See Horizontal Merger Guidelines at § 1 (noting how enhanced “market 
power can also be manifested in non-price terms and conditions that adversely affect cus-
tomers, including reduced product quality, reduced product variety, reduced service, or 
diminished innovation”); id at § 12 (noting how the agencies consider whether a merger is 
likely to enhance market power on the buying side of the market) (cited in note 39). None-
theless, the agencies often consider the merger’s impact downstream on price. As a result, 
scholars recommend that any competitive analysis of mergers include upstream effects. 
See Carstensen, Competition Policy at 94–96 (cited in note 36). This includes identifying 
the various labor markets affected by the mergers and assessing the effect of the merger 
on concentration in these labor markets. See, for example, Alan B. Krueger and Eric A. 
Posner, Policy Proposal: A Proposal for Protecting Low-Income Workers from Monopsony 
and Collusion *12 (Hamilton Project, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/6XSL-43NL. This 
includes calculating the premerger and postmerger HHI levels of these labor markets and 
recognizing “a presumption against a merger if the postmerger absolute level of concen-
tration and/or the increase indicate too high a risk of wage suppression.” Id. 
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D. Agreements Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act 
Congress should update laws that govern agreements be-
tween or among parties under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, in-
cluding vertical restraints such as resale price maintenance, ter-
ritorial and other nonprice restraints, and noncompete clauses 
and other provisions restricting workers’ rights in labor con-
tracts.48 This should include: 
• Clarifying that federal antitrust law covers and equally 
protects both inter- and intrabrand competition—that is, 
competition both within and between supplier-distributor 
networks, such as franchises;49 
• Specifying that price and nonprice vertical restraints are 
illegal, including in the labor market, other than in nar-
row circumstances when no party to them possesses mar-
ket power and the restraints are necessary to foster inno-
vation and competition;50 and 
• Further clarifying that attempts to engage in unlawful 
conduct (such as collusion), in addition to the conduct it-
self, are prohibited.51 
 
 48 See 15 USC § 1. 
 49 For example, in Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc v PSKS, Inc, 551 US 877 
(2007), the Court justified a reduction in intrabrand competition by opining that the anti-
trust laws’ primary purpose is to protect interbrand competition. See id at 890. But this 
policy statement never came from the Sherman Act or its legislative history. It came from 
a footnote in Continental T.V., Inc v GTE Sylvania Inc, 433 US 36 (1977), in which the 
Court stated that “[i]nterbrand competition is the competition among the manufacturers 
of the same generic product—television sets in this case—and is the primary concern of 
antitrust law.” Id at 52 n 19. While true for generic products, this is not true for brand-
differentiated goods. Try negotiating a better price for a BMW with the price of an Audi 
or Mercedes (interbrand competition) versus the price of that same BMW offered by an-
other dealer (intrabrand competition). The recent economic findings, post-Leegin, “are con-
sistent with the view that anticompetitive explanations for resale price maintenance tend 
to predominate over procompetitive explanations.” Baker, Antitrust Paradigm at 89 (cited 
in note 22). The effective competition standard would create a strong presumption against 
price and nonprice vertical restraints. 
 50 See, for example, Leegin, 551 US at 913 (Breyer dissenting) (noting how the Court 
identified two potential benefits of resale price maintenance: facilitating entry and curbing 
free-riding). Thus, unlike the per-se-illegal standard, the proposed standard would permit 
vertical restraints when they are unlikely to undermine intrabrand competition. See also 
John B. Kirkwood, Rethinking Antitrust Policy Toward RPM, 55 Antitrust Bull 423, 459–
70 (2010) (proposing as an alternative to the rule of reason a presumption of illegality 
combined with safe harbors). 
 51 The FTC can challenge invitations to collude under Section 5 of the FTC Act. See 
15 USC § 45. The primary mechanism for the DOJ to prosecute such attempts would be 
as an attempt-to-monopolize claim under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, which is harder 
612 The University of Chicago Law Review [86:595 
 
E. Reorient Courts and Enforcers to Look More Often 
Upstream 
Antitrust laws in the United States are meant to protect 
sellers and workers. One positive sign was the DOJ, in 2016, an-
nouncing its intention to “criminally investigate naked no-poaching 
or wage-fixing agreements that are unrelated or unnecessary to a 
larger legitimate collaboration between the employers.”52 The 
agency, along with the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), af-
firmed that workers, like other sellers, are entitled to the benefits 
of a competitive market for their services.53 Unfortunately, the 
DOJ recently retreated significantly from that stance in its inter-
vention in private actions against no-poaching clauses in fran-
chising contracts.54 
When they look upstream, enforcers and courts should not 
assume that monopsonies are the mirror images of monopolies.55 
In the leading monopsony case, Weyerhaeuser Co v Ross-Simmons 
Hardwood Lumber Co,56 the Court’s initial premise was that mo-
nopoly and monopsony power were economically similar and 
shared a close theoretical connection.57 Given the “kinship be-
tween monopoly and monopsony” power, the Court suggested 
“that similar legal standards should apply” to monopolization and 
monopsonization claims.58 But developing the legal standards for 
 
to prove. As a result, the DOJ brings far fewer invitation-to-collude cases. For one notable 
example, see generally United States v American Airlines, Inc, 743 F2d 1114 (5th Cir 1984). 
 52 Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, FTC and DOJ Release 
Guidance for Human Resource Professionals on How Antitrust Law Applies to Employee 
Hiring and Compensation (Oct 20, 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/23YX-HRMA. 
 53 See id. 
 54 See Marshall Steinbaum, Antitrust, the Gig Economy, and Labor Market Power, 
82 L & Contemp Probs 45, 51–52 (2019). 
 55 See generally Stucke, 62 Emory L J 1509 (cited in note 36). 
 56 549 US 312 (2007). 
 57 See id at 321–22. See also Todd v Exxon Corp, 275 F3d 191, 202 (2d Cir 2001) 
(noting that because “the equation for measuring market power in monopsony is a mirror 
image of the relationships that create market power in a seller[,] . . . [a] greater availabil-
ity of substitute buyers indicates a smaller quantum of market power on the part of the 
buyers in question”) (quotation marks and citations omitted); Growers 1-7 v Ocean Spray 
Cranberries, Inc, 2015 WL 13649090, *4 (D Mass); GMA Cover Corp v Saab Barracuda 
LLC, 2012 WL 642739, *6 (ED Mich), adopted by 2012 WL 639528 (ED Mich); Sprint 
Nextel Corp v AT&T Inc, 821 F Supp 2d 308, 324 (DDC 2011); In re Southeastern Milk 
Antitrust Litigation, 801 F Supp 2d 705, 724 (ED Tenn 2011); Addamax Corp v Open Soft-
ware Foundation Inc, 888 F Supp 274, 280 n 9 (D Mass 1995); Federal Trade Commission 
and Department of Justice, Improving Health Care: A Dose of Competition ch 6, *13 (2004) 
(Health Report), archived at https://perma.cc/7BK8-XJZZ. 
 58 Weyerhaeuser, 549 US at 322. 
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evaluating monopsonization claims is more complex than simply 
mirroring monopolization standards. 
One important distinction between monopoly and monopsony 
is the market share needed to infer significant power. Courts, 
when reviewing monopolization claims, typically require the de-
fendant’s market share to be very large—often 70 percent or 
more.59 One district court dismissed a claim under Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act because the market share of approximately 40 per-
cent did not meet “the threshold of what it takes to establish mo-
nopoly or monopsony power.”60 
On the other hand, retailers with a 20 percent market share 
can enjoy significant buyer power over sellers.61 The FTC and 
DOJ recognize the difficulty, “in the abstract, to state market 
share thresholds for such monopsony concerns.”62 Rather than 
rely on market-share thresholds alone to find monopsony power, 
the agencies correctly encourage the courts to consider several in-
terrelated factors: 
(1) a large market share on the part of the purchaser; (2) an 
upward sloping or somewhat inelastic supply curve in the in-
put market; and (3) an inability or unwillingness for new pur-
chasers to enter the market or current purchasers to expand 
the amount of their purchases in the market.63 
Consequently, under the effective competition standard, 
courts and agencies can lessen the risk of false negatives by look-
ing beyond market-share thresholds upstream. Even in properly 
defined markets, buyers with low market shares can at times ex-
ert tremendous power. In their ability to decide when, whether, 
 
 59 See United States v Aluminum Co of America, 148 F2d 416, 424 (2d Cir 1945) 
(observing that “it is doubtful whether sixty or sixty-four percent” is sufficient “and cer-
tainly thirty-three per cent is not”); Southeastern Milk, 801 F Supp 2d at 725 (noting that 
Byars v Bluff City News Co, 609 F2d 843, 850 (6th Cir 1979), determined that “75–80 per-
cent or greater is a ‘starting point’ in assessing monopoly power”); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco 
Co v Philip Morris Inc, 199 F Supp 2d 362, 394 (MD NC 2002) (“Seventy to seventy-five per 
cent is generally considered the minimum market share necessary to support a finding of 
monopoly power.”), affd RJ Reynolds Tobacco Co v Philip Morris USA, Inc, 67 F Appx 810 
(4th Cir 2003). 
 60 Southeastern Milk, 801 F Supp 2d at 727. See also Lima LS PLC v PHL Variable 
Insurance Co, 2013 WL 12286066, *1 n 1 (D Conn) (“The equation for measuring market 
power in monopsony is a ‘mirror image’ of the relationships creating market power in a 
seller.”). 
 61 See Carstensen, Competition Policy at 58 (cited in note 36); Toys “R” Us, Inc v 
Federal Trade Commission, 221 F3d 928, 937 (7th Cir 2000). 
 62 Health Report at ch 6, *17 (cited in note 57). 
 63 Id. 
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and from whom to buy a perishable product, and how much of 
that product to purchase, buyers perhaps have relatively more 
power than sellers; thus, buyers in these industries can discipline 
sellers more effectively from exercising market power than sellers 
can discipline buyers. It may also be that sellers in some indus-
tries are more dependent on the buyers than the buyers are de-
pendent on the sellers. Depending on the elasticity of demand of 
the fringe buyers and overall supply, firms with relatively low 
market shares can enjoy as much, if not greater, buyer power as 
firms with higher market shares.64 
The issue of false positives, however, remains. Monopsonists 
can have low market shares, but many buyers with low market 
shares are not monopsonists. Likewise, all monopsonists possess 
buyer power, but not all firms with buyer power are monopso-
nists, in the sense of having high market share.65 Reduction in 
sellers’ output is not the telltale mark of monopsony; buyers, for 
example, can price discriminate. 
Therefore, in assessing upstream abuses, agencies and courts 
should use a sliding scale. The lower the alleged monopsonist’s 
market share, the greater the plaintiff’s burden in showing: 
(1) the fringe buyers’ inability to acquire more of the sellers’ out-
put and (2) the sellers’ inability to easily and cheaply produce and 
sell other products in other locales, or to other buyers. Granted, 
this is, at times, a matter of degree. The defendant can be a “hard-
nosed actor in the market”66 without being a monopsonist. 
Thus, a rule of thumb is the buyer’s coercion.67 Coercion im-
plicitly incorporates both elasticity of demand of the fringe buyers 
and overall supply; as the sellers’ price is depressed, there remain 
 
 64 Arguably, market-share thresholds are arbitrary for both monopsony and monop-
oly claims. Indeed, the same factors to show monopsony power, despite a relatively low 
market share, could show monopoly power. In other words, when the elasticity of supply 
by fringe sellers and the elasticity of consumer demand are both low, a firm with, for ex-
ample, a 43 percent market share could also exercise monopoly power. Plaintiffs, however, 
rarely challenge the monopolization case law’s market-share thresholds per se. Instead, the 
litigants typically debate whether the market should be defined more broadly or narrowly. 
 65 See Health Report at ch 6, *18 (cited in note 57) (noting that “because one of the 
purposes of managed care is to lower prices closer to a competitive level, it can be difficult 
to determine when a managed care purchaser is exercising monopsony power”). 
 66 Southeastern Milk, 801 F Supp 2d at 727. 
 67 For consideration of a coercion standard in light of foreign law, see generally 
Albert A. Foer, Abuse of Superior Bargaining Position (ASBP): What Can We Learn from 
Our Trading Partners? (American Antitrust Institute Working Paper No 16-02, Sept 29, 
2016), archived at https://perma.cc/37U7-DNHW. 
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few alternative buyers or alternative selling opportunities to res-
cue the exploited sellers from their captivity to the buyer. Although 
market power “ordinarily is inferred from the seller’s possession 
of a predominant share of the market,”68 the Supreme Court has 
explained that underlying market power is coercion, namely, “the 
power ‘to force a purchaser to do something that he would not do 
in a competitive market.’”69 The more the evidence shows that the 
firm is forcing sellers to do things that they would not otherwise 
do in a competitive market, the more likely the firm possesses 
buyer power, even when its market share is relatively low. The 
stronger the evidence of the buyer’s coercion, the stronger the in-
ference of monopsony power. 
Moreover, there is strong evidence to suspect that monopsony 
power can be projected upstream at two or even three removes 
from the site of the dominant monopsonist. One recent study finds 
that powerful retail and manufacturing distributors can secure 
substantial price concessions from their suppliers, who, in turn, 
reduce margins on their workforces in the form of lower wages 
and more precarious working conditions.70 
Looking upstream is critical because the recent economic ev-
idence suggests that labor-market concentration exerts down-
ward pressure on wages, induces employers to shift the costs of 
training onto workers, and results in greater inequality among 
firms hiring in a labor market.71 To habituate the agencies to look 
upstream, the effective competition standard would require agen-
cies and courts to consider whether a merger may substantially 
lessen competition or tend to create a monopsony for upstream 
labor, supplier, and product markets.72 The reforms under the 
 
 68 Eastman Kodak Co v Image Technical Services, Inc, 504 US 451, 464 (1992). 
 69 Id, quoting Jefferson Parish Hospital District No 2 v Hyde, 466 US 2, 14 (1984). 
 70 See Nathan Wilmers, Wage Stagnation and Buyer Power: How Buyer-Supplier Re-
lations Affect U.S. Workers’ Wages, 1978 to 2014, 83 Am Sociological Rev 213, 215–16 (2018). 
 71 See generally José Azar, Ioana Marinescu, and Marshall I. Steinbaum, Labor Mar-
ket Concentration (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No 24147, Feb 
2017), archived at https://perma.cc/Y5CU-KSN5. See also Baker, Antitrust Paradigm at 
22 (cited in note 22). See also generally Brad Hershbein and Claudia Macaluso, Labor 
Market Concentration and the Demand for Skills (Institute of Labor Economics Working 
Paper, July 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/TYY5-S8BG; David Berger, Kyle Herkenhoff, 
and Simon Mongey, Labor Market Power (Institute of Labor Economics Discussion Paper 
No 12276, Apr 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/NWA8-4LZH. 
 72 For the deficiencies of the earlier approach and harms from restraints and mergers 
upstream, see Carstensen, Competition Policy at 105–16, 128–31, 260–63 (cited in 
note 36); Krueger and Posner, Policy Proposal at *12 (cited in note 47) (recommending 
that the agencies’ merger guidelines include a new section that directs the government to 
screen mergers based on their likely effects on labor markets). 
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Sherman Act would also apply upstream to include monopsoniza-
tion claims and anticompetitive restraints by buyers. Claimed ef-
ficiencies cannot amount to (or be derived from) the defendant’s 
anticompetitive behavior in upstream markets. 
F. Looking Beyond Price Effects 
Competition agencies recognize that anticompetitive behav-
ior can affect not just price and output but also privacy protection, 
quality, variety, services, and innovation. Nonetheless, courts 
usually measure an injury to competition “by a reduction in out-
put and an increase in prices in the relevant market.”73 As Profes-
sor Jon Baker notes: 
If competition would be harmed on dimensions other than 
price, such as quality or innovation, it would also not matter 
whether the price (or the quality-adjusted price) exceeds a 
competitive level. The antitrust issue is whether the reduc-
tion in competition made the terms of trade adverse to buyers 
relative to the but-for world, regardless of the dimensions on 
which the firms compete or the absolute level of prices.74 
The effective competition standard would require the courts and 
agencies to look beyond price effects in mergers, anticompetitive 
conduct, and monopolization and monopsonization cases, includ-
ing effects on other important, nonprice parameters of competi-
tion (such as quality, choice, and privacy). In weighing these ef-
fects, courts should not offset harm to competition for one set of 
stakeholders with benefits for another when there is no mecha-
nism for compensation, as is usually the case. 
The effective competition standard would also recognize that 
when a company violates the antitrust laws, the harm can be com-
pounded when the conduct violates other laws meant to protect 
historically disadvantaged groups that have been excluded or 
marginalized from the economy (such as the civil rights laws). 
This would include illegal market allocations on the basis of his-
torically disadvantaged groups’ races and identities. 
 
 73 Sterling Merchandising, Inc v Nestlé, S.A., 656 F3d 112, 121 (1st Cir 2011) (em-
phasis omitted). 
 74 Baker, Antitrust Paradigm at 180 (cited in note 22). 
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G. Remedies 
The effective competition standard would adopt a preference 
for structural remedies. Ironically, in Standard Oil Co of New 
Jersey v United States,75 which introduced the rule-of-reason 
analysis that eventually became so unwieldy, the Court also sup-
ported strong structural remedies, including breaking up the mo-
nopoly and monopsony.76 
Thus, at a minimum, enforcers need to prevent monopo-
lies/monopsonies from getting bigger. This means enforcing the 
Clayton and Sherman Acts as they were intended: cracking down 
trends toward concentration and anticompetitive practices—such 
as Google diverting search engine traffic to its own comparison 
shopping service while burying its rivals’ services less promi-
nently in the results.77 The goal is to thwart these anticompetitive 
risks in their incipiency. 
It also means blocking mergers rather than allowing the mer-
ger to go through with myriad behavioral conditions (as was the case 
of Comcast-NBCU,78 Google-ITA Software,79 and Ticketmaster-
LiveNation80). 
IV.  WHAT NEEDS TO HAPPEN TO IMPLEMENT THE EFFECTIVE 
COMPETITION STANDARD INTO FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY? 
The existing consumer welfare standard is not statutory. It 
represents the industrial policy favoring consolidation and verti-
cal integration promoted by the Chicago, post-Chicago, and Harvard 
School adherents. Given the mounting evidence that the con-
sumer welfare standard has failed to protect competition and con-
sumers, as well as the standard’s operational difficulties, the 
standard should be scrapped. 
Thus, we can rectify the market power problem through five 
different avenues: 
 
 75 221 US 1 (1911). 
 76 See id at 77–82. 
 77 See European Commission, 39740 Google Search (Shopping) *103–08 (2017), ar-
chived at https://perma.cc/CJU6-W7VA. 
 78 See Modified Final Judgment, United States v Comcast Corp, No 1:11-cv-00106, 
*9–14 (DDC filed Aug 21, 2013). 
 79 See Final Judgment, United States v Google Inc, No 1:11-cv-00688, *13–27 (DDC 
filed Oct 5, 2011). 
 80 See Final Judgment, United States v Ticketmaster Entertainment, Inc, No 1:10-cv-
00139, *8–14 (DDC filed July 30, 2010). 
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• First, courts and agencies, without any legislative action, 
can enforce the federal antitrust laws as Congress in-
tended them. Nothing prevents them from actually doing 
this. The effective competition standard, while new, is ac-
tually consistent with the legislative aim of the Sherman 
and Clayton Acts. 
• Second, the FTC can use its authority under the FTC 
Act,81 as Congress intended, to reach these anticompeti-
tive practices and mergers through rulemaking.82 
• Third, Congress could amend the Sherman and Clayton 
Acts to clearly prescribe the effective competition stand-
ard and delineate legal presumptions for common anti-
competitive restraints to effectuate the standard. 
• Fourth, Congress could enact a new civil antitrust statute 
and also delegate power to the FTC to make regulations 
for specific per se illegal rules and presumptions under 
the new standard. 
• Finally, Congress could choose not to pass the effective 
competition legal standard itself but instead pass other 
specific measures that would effectuate the standard (as 
outlined above in Part III). 
The first two options are possible. The FTC Act is intended to 
broaden the agency’s mandate beyond the Clayton and Sherman 
Acts. But the composition of the federal judiciary, the time and 
expense to undo the damage caused by the Supreme Court’s ex-
cursions in economic theory, the disincentives of the antitrust 
agencies to undertake this change, and the continuing harm to 
the public in the interim all call for legislative action. Given the 
failure of the more elitist branches of government to protect com-
petition, it is appropriate for the democratically accountable 
branch to step in. 
This brings us to the third and fourth options. Other jurisdic-
tions, like Germany, have recently updated their competition 
 
 81 38 Stat 717 (1914), codified as amended at 15 USC § 41 et seq. 
 82 For a defense of FTC rulemaking, see generally, for example, Comment of Federal 
Trade Commissioner Rohit Chopra, Competition and Consumer Protection in the 21st 
Century, Hearing Before the Federal Trade Commission (2018), archived at 
https://perma.cc/Q4E9-U6LQ. 
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laws for the digital economy.83 While Congress has amended the 
federal antitrust laws over the years, it hasn’t significantly 
changed the substance of the federal antitrust laws for over sixty 
years.84 Part of this may be attributable to the Sherman and 
Clayton Acts being viewed as common law. Another factor is that 
the Sherman Act imposes both criminal and civil liability.85 No 
doubt, any statutory changes must account for these factors. 
In amending US competition laws, Congress will likely con-
front the issue whether it needs to change only the standard (for 
example, adding the language of an effective competition stand-
ard) and/or specific presumptions and per se rules to promote that 
standard. 
Under rule-of-law principles, the judiciary’s role should be to 
interpret the antitrust laws based on (1) the original laws and 
(2) precedent that is true to the original laws. It would not inter-
pret the acts based on what it believes to be the latest economic 
thinking on competition policy.86 By declaring specific principles, 
Congress would be assured that the courts, under a rule of law, 
would construe the antitrust laws to further those principles, and 
would circumscribe the courts from arbitrarily reaching stand-
ards (or results) inconsistent with those principles. 
Thus, we advocate two components: first, Congress should 
recognize that antitrust law invariably promotes multiple eco-
nomic, political, and social objectives, rather than a single defini-
tion of harm to competition. Every country’s competition law 
likely encompasses, but does not necessarily rank, multiple goals. 
 
 83 For example, in 2017 Germany amended its competition law to specify that direct 
and indirect network effects be considered in assessing a firm’s market position. Act 
Against Restraints of Competition, § 18 (3(a)) (Competition Act—GWB), last amended by 
Article 10(9) of the Act of 30 October 2017, archived at https://perma.cc/Y8XH-ZTMP. In 
2019, Germany proposed additional amendments to protect competition in the digital plat-
form economy, including requiring in any assessment of market power the firm’s access to 
data relevant for competition. See Draft Proposal for the 10th Amendment of the German 
Competition Act (D’Kart, Oct 7, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/5PA3-5543. 
 84 See Federal Trade Commission, The Antitrust Laws, archived at 
https://perma.cc/3SSF-YY5K. 
 85 15 USC §§ 2, 15(a)–(h). 
 86 See Spencer Weber Waller, Microsoft and Trinko: A Tale of Two Courts, 2006 Utah 
L Rev 741, 749 (“The Trinko Court’s pronouncements on this score stand merely as a na-
ked assertion of a policy preference that has been rejected since the passage of the anti-
trust laws themselves.”). 
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The issue is not whether competition policy should incorpo-
rate noneconomic values. Rather, the issue is the degree of free-
dom that courts and enforcers should have in weighing multiple 
goals and multiple stakeholders in their analyses. 
Here, we see the shortcomings of the Court’s prevailing rule-
of-reason legal standard to evaluate most antitrust claims. One 
generally cannot have, consistent with the rule of law, a fact-
specific weighing standard, like the rule of reason, and multiple 
objectives. Having the agencies and courts blend goals in every 
antitrust case is a recipe for disaster. It is questionable whether 
antitrust enforcers and courts can systematically operationalize 
multiple goals in the vacuous rule of reason, regardless of 
whether they apply a consumer welfare or an effective competi-
tion standard. Moreover, allowing them to blend goals creates 
more opportunities for error and political capture. 
Consequently, in addition to an effective competition stand-
ard that recognizes antitrust’s multiple aims, the second signifi-
cant component we advocate is shifting from the Court’s unwieldy 
rule of reason to clearer legal presumptions. Congress can shift 
the Court from its “case-by-case” rule-of-reason analysis, which 
focuses on the “particular facts disclosed by the record,”87 to sim-
pler antitrust presumptions and rules “clear enough for lawyers 
to explain them to clients.”88 The proposed legislation would shift, 
whenever feasible, from directly regulating market participants’ 
behavior ex post to employing legal presumptions that seek to 
promote a competitive structure ex ante and preserving freedom 
therein. 
This would significantly streamline, rather than complicate, 
the enforcement of the antitrust laws. The current rule-of-reason 
review “is data-intensive and, consequently, expensive for liti-
gants; also, it consumes large amounts of court time and other 
resources.”89 It is little wonder why so few antitrust plaintiffs can 
afford to bring such cases to trial. 
Ideally, Congress would enact the effective competition 
standard alongside legal presumptions that are simple enough for 
 
 87 Eastman Kodak, 504 US at 467, quoting Maple Flooring Manufacturers Associa-
tion v United States, 268 US 563, 579 (1925). 
 88 Pacific Bell Telephone Co v linkLine Communications, Inc, 555 US 438, 453 (2009), 
quoting Concord v Boston Edison Co, 915 F2d 17, 22 (1st Cir 1990). 
 89 California v Safeway, Inc, 651 F3d 1118, 1146 (9th Cir 2011) (Reinhardt concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part). 
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counsel to explain to their clients, agencies to enforce, and courts 
to apply. 
Furthermore, an effective competition standard would ex-
pand the theories of harm available to antitrust plaintiffs, and 
thus reduce the potency of defendants’ strategy of using economic 
theory to dispatch with claimed price increases or output reduc-
tions to consumers. So, while the policy objectives for antitrust 
enforcement would indeed expand with the effective competition 
standard (relative to what has been propounded under the con-
sumer welfare standard), the proposed standard coupled with the 
legal presumptions would nonetheless significantly reduce the 
administrative burden of individual enforcement actions—ulti-
mately returning antitrust to its proper role as law enforcement 
rather than highly stylized theoretical speculation. 
CONCLUSION 
Today, we have the following incongruities in our economy 
and society: 
• First, the current antitrust policies claim to promote the 
welfare of consumers. This has not happened.90 
• Second, courts often proclaim that antitrust law protects 
competition, not individual competitors.91 But competi-
tion has diminished as a result of the courts’ and agencies’ 
largely noninterventionist policies. 
 
 90 Steinbaum and Stucke, Effective Competition at 22–28 (cited in note 20). 
 91 See, for example, Starlight Cinemas v Regal Entertainment Group, 691 F Appx 
404, 405 (9th Cir 2017), quoting AT&T Mobility LLC v AU Optronics Corp, 707 F3d 1106, 
1112 (9th Cir 2013). The origin of this claim is Brown Shoe, 370 US at 344 (“It is competi-
tion, not competitors, which the Act protects.”). Ironically, modern courts typically ignore 
what the Court said immediately after making that statement:  
But we cannot fail to recognize Congress’ desire to promote competition through 
the protection of viable, small, locally owned businesses. Congress appreciated 
that occasional higher costs and prices might result from the maintenance of 
fragmented industries and markets. It resolved these competing considerations 
in favor of decentralization. We must give effect to that decision.  
Id. The modern courts also ignore the Court’s extensive discussion in Brown Shoe of the 
congressional intent of the 1950 amendments to the Clayton Act: “The dominant theme 
pervading congressional consideration of the 1950 amendments was a fear of what was 
considered to be a rising tide of economic concentration in the American economy.” Id at 
315. “Other considerations cited in support” of the 1950 legislation were “the desirability 
of retaining ‘local control’ over industry and the protection of small businesses.” Id at 315–
16. For a recent example, see Justice Neil Gorsuch’s early intervention in the oral argu-
ment in American Express. Transcript of Oral Argument, Ohio v American Express Co, 
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• Third, while the Supreme Court of late has complained 
about the state of antitrust litigation (the interminable 
litigation, inevitably costly and protracted discovery 
phase, and the high risk of inconsistent results by lower 
courts), the Court itself has created this predicament.92 
Over the past forty years, the Court has increasingly re-
lied on its fact-specific weighing standard (the rule of rea-
son) and its vague economic goal (consumer welfare), even 
though each accommodates different personal values and 
interpretation and often points to no particular course of 
action. 
• Fourth, while policymakers recognize dynamic competi-
tion as more important, antitrust agencies and courts 
have tended to avoid dynamic efficiency analysis, focus-
ing instead on static price competition and productive ef-
ficiencies.93 And insofar as antitrust does take a position 
on the distribution of economic surplus to consumers (ver-
sus producers), its narrow focus on price effects has 
carved out substantial space for business models that 
harm consumers—and society more broadly—in other 
ways, such as by harvesting their data for sale to third 
parties, discriminating in terms of quality, segmenting 
and dividing the market, and obstructing consumers’ ac-
cess to innovative entrants and alternative sources of 
supply.94 
• Fifth is the economic power paradox. Our constitutional 
framework seeks to distribute power rather than promote 
its concentration. Despite historical concerns about con-
centrated economic power, the Court in Verizon Commu-
nications Inc v Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko95 praised 
 
No 16-1454, *4 (US filed Feb 26, 2018) (available on Westlaw at 2018 WL 1050562) (“We’re 
not here to protect competitors . . . or necessarily even merchants.”). 
 92 See Maurice E. Stucke, Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of Law?, 42 UC 
Davis L Rev 1375, 1378 (2009). 
 93 See Brodley, 62 NYU L Rev at 1026 (cited in note 5). 
 94 See generally Marshall Steinbaum, Eric Harris Bernstein, and John Sturm, Pow-
erless: How Lax Antitrust and Concentrated Market Power Rig the Economy Against Amer-
ican Workers, Consumers, and Communities (Roosevelt Institute, Feb 2018), archived at 
https://perma.cc/8S9V-RVVA. 
 95 540 US 398 (2004). 
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monopoly prices as an important part of our free-market 
system.96 
Between monopsony power, foreclosure, domination of the 
market by powerful distributors, and a multitude of other abuses 
the antitrust laws sought to rectify, the harms caused by the con-
sumer welfare standard as it is interpreted and enforced—as op-
posed to how it was intended—indicate the need for a substantial 
overhaul. 
Given the mounting evidence of the failures of current anti-
trust policies, we need to promote competition. Toward that end, 
a new standard and new legal presumptions to promote effective 
competition are not only warranted—they are necessary. 
 
 96 See id at 407 (“The mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant 
charging of monopoly prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an important element of the 
free-market system.”). In returning to the congressional purpose of the Sherman Act, the 
Court more recently condemned, rather than praised, monopoly pricing. Apple Inc v Pep-
per, 139 S Ct 1514, 1525 (2019) (“Ever since Congress overwhelmingly passed and Presi-
dent Benjamin Harrison signed the Sherman Act in 1890, protecting consumers from mo-
nopoly prices has been the central concern of antitrust.”) (quotation marks omitted). 
Nonetheless, the dicta in Trinko has taken on new meaning with the lower courts and 
agencies. See, for example, United States’ Statement of Interest Concerning Qualcomm’s 
Motion for Partial Stay of Injunction Pending Appeal, Federal Trade Commission v 
Qualcomm Inc, No 5:17-cv-00220-LHK, *4 (9th Cir filed July 16, 2019) (available on 
Westlaw at 2019 WL 3306496) (arguing in favor of the monopoly, and against the FTC’s 
action and lower court’s ruling, the DOJ argued that “[c]harging high prices is not anti-
competitive”). 
